This paper documents the increasing importance of software for successful innovation in manufacturing sectors well beyond the traditional definition of electronics and information technology. Using panel data for 229 publicly listed firms from 18 countries across four manufacturing industries over the period 1981-2005, we find significant variation across firms in the software intensity of their innovative activity. Firms that exhibit a higher level of software intensity generate more patents per R&D dollar, and their investment in R&D is more highly valued by equity markets. We present evidence that geographic differences in the abundance of skilled software labor are an important factor in determining sample firms' software intensity and performance.
I. Introduction
"We believe that every industrial company will become a software company."
-GE CEO Jeffrey Immelt, in his annual letter to GE shareholders, 2014. 1 This paper documents a significant change in the nature and direction of invention in four "traditional" manufacturing industries. In autos and auto parts, aerospace and defense, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals, inventors and product developers are increasingly using software, rather than more traditional mechanical or chemical engineering, to differentiate products, enhance product performance, and increase user utility. Engineers and industry experts in these sectors have provided anecdotal evidence of a software-biased shift in the trajectory of innovation, but this evidence has generally rested on a relatively small number of possibly unrepresentative firms and products. Using much more comprehensive patent and patent citation data, we present new statistical evidence showing that this software-biased shift is persistent, systematic, and increasingly pervasive. We also point to other indicators suggesting that this shift extends far beyond the boundaries of our four target industries.
If software has indeed become an increasingly important input into the creation of new inventions, then firms that take advantage of this software-biased shift should become better innovators than their industry peers who do not. Our empirical analysis suggests this is exactly what has happened. Using an unbalanced panel of publicly traded firms in our four target industries over the period 1981-2005, we show that the firms in these industries that have taken a more software-intensive approach to innovation have increasingly outperformed their less software-intensive peers in terms of patent productivity (patents per R&D dollar) and the market value of their R&D investment. 2 We also show that the relative performance of software-intensive firms improves at the same time that the software-intensity of innovation in these sectors grows. Using a variety of robustness checks, we demonstrate that we can exclude several competing explanations for the observed outperformance of the software-intensive firms.
Why is it that some firms were able to take advantage of this software-biased shift in technological change while others were not? We provide suggestive evidence that geographic differences in the abundance of skilled software engineers have been an important factor in determining sample firms' software intensity and innovation performance. Drawing upon multiple data sources, we present new estimates of the numbers of IT / software engineers available for hire in the major national labor markets where our sample firms are based. We supplement these estimates with data on flows of immigrant IT professionals and the magnitude of offshoring of software engineering. We find large and growing asymmetries across countries in the endowments of software engineering human resources, providing a partial explanation for the differences in the software intensity of R&D that we observe in firms headquartered in different countries.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews research from the engineering and management literatures that points to a significant increase in the importance of software as an enabler of innovation in four "traditional" manufacturing sectors. While suggestive, this research tends to be somewhat anecdotal, relying heavily on the experience of a small number of firms and a highly selected sample of recent product development efforts. Section III presents new statistical evidence based on patent citation data that suggests the software-biased shift in the direction of technological change suggested by the engineering and managerial literatures is real, broad-based, and economically and statistically significant.
Section IV empirically examines the implications of this shift in software intensity for the innovation performance of firms in the four manufacturing sectors that are the focus of our study. Section V discusses several possible explanations for the trends we observe in our data and ties them to the existing literature. Section VI concludes with a summary of key results and avenues for future research.
II. The Changing Technology of Technological Change in Four Manufacturing Sectors
A survey of the engineering literature suggests a pronounced increase in the importance of software for product development and innovation across a range of manufacturing industries. In this paper, we focus on automobiles and auto parts, aerospace and defense, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals.
However, there is evidence indicating this trend extends to construction equipment, farm implements, IT hardware, and power generation and transmission, among other industries. 3 In the automotive industry, the amount of software in cars has been steadily rising over the past two decades, and competitive differentiation is increasingly realized through software-based capabilities (Grimm, 2003; Frischkorn, 2004) . Up to 40% of the cost of a new vehicle is now determined by its electronics and software content (Shorey, 2011) . This percentage is likely to rise further; some industry observers contend that more than 70% of all innovations in the contemporary automotive sector are driven by software (Grimm, 2003; Shorey, 2011) . Today, premium cars are equipped with up to 70-80 microprocessors, connected by 5-6 internal digital networks (Nelson, 2004) , and the latest electric vehicles such as the Chevrolet Volt rely upon more than 10 million lines of computer code, easily surpassing the numbers of lines of computer code required to run Boeing's 787 Dreamliner or the new F-35 fighter.
In a modern passenger vehicle, software manages everything from its powertrain, fuel and ignition, and carbon emissions, to the car's power antenna. As a consequence, automotive and auto parts companies are increasingly investing in the internal acquisition of software capabilities through rapid hiring of software engineers (Waterman, 2011) and are building outside competencies by working closely with software firms. 4 Software design teams have become increasingly prominent decision-makers at the product design stage (Mustapic et al, 2004) . The high degree of interest in autonomous vehicles suggests these trends have much farther to go.
A similar trend is apparent in the aerospace and defense arena. According to many industry experts, the entire aviation industry has been undergoing a process of transformation away from dependence on traditional manufacturing towards something that "looks more like IBM and Microsoft with wings" (Hughes, 1998) . The Boeing 777 contains 1,280 onboard processors that use more than 4 million lines of computer code. Blackhawk helicopters contain almost 2,000 pounds of wire connecting the on-board computers and sensors, and experts claim that designing the electronic systems for this aircraft was more 3 For a qualitative overview of the impact of these trends in farm implements and electric power, see Biba (2014) and Clancy (2014), respectively. The rising importance of software in construction and mining equipment was verified by direct conversations with Carnegie Mellon-affiliated robotics experts and profiled in Green (2012). See Arora, Branstetter, and Drev (2012) for an econometric examination of the rising role of software in IT hardware product development. Our decision to focus on the four sectors examined in this paper was driven, in part, by data availability. As we discuss in the paper, the limited availability of R&D expenditure data was a major constraint. 4 Interviews with an engineer employed by a leading multinational auto parts producer indicated that this firm had undertaken a major investment in software capabilities, hired thousands of software engineers, and built up research facilities in regions as diverse as Pittsburgh (PA) and India in order to tap the right skills for its increasingly software-intensive approach to product development.
difficult than designing the aircraft itself. Many modern aircraft cannot fly without their onboard computer systems (e.g. F-16 and F-117), air traffic control systems are wholly dependent on software systems, and modern aircraft and spacecraft systems seldom work alone -they are usually part of a system of systems (Long, 2008) . While aerospace products have included embedded software at least since the 1970s, when digital electronics and software first came into use for onboard engine control on commercial aircraft (Potocki de Montalk, 1993) , this trend has been quickly accelerating since the 1990s (Holloway and Hayhurst, 2003) . As a result, software costs are major components of product innovation and design for large aerospace companies. Boeing, for example, has significantly increased the amount of money invested in software as part of more recent product development efforts, and outlays per product generation are now in the billions of dollars (Long, 2012) .
Experts agree that software has also become ubiquitous in medical devices and is the source of critical capabilities in products ranging from digital thermometers, insulin pumps, pacemakers, and cardiac monitors to anesthesia machines, large ultrasound imaging systems, MRI scanners, chemistry analyzers, and proton beam therapy systems (Sandler et al, 2010; Bakal, 2011; Jones, Jetley, and Abraham, 2010) .
Mai-Duc (2011) reports that more than 50% of marketed medical devices contain software. A current state-of-the-art pacemaker contains up to 80,000 lines of software code, while a simple infusion pump can contain upwards of 170,000 lines of code (Jones, Jetley, and Abraham, 2010) . Kahn (1991) and Holden (1986) assert that the trend of software utilization in medical devices and equipment has been in place at least since the mid-1980s when first devices with key capabilities enabled by microprocessors and controlled by embedded software came to market. However, the software intensity of medical devices has been accelerating particularly quickly in the past decade (Wasden, 2011). 5 As medical device manufacturers reposition themselves by bundling physical devices with valueadded software-based features, they require an expanding array of specialized software skillsets (Joglekar and Rosenthal, 2003) . As a consequence, these firms are increasingly forced to focus on software engineering and to adopt rigorous software development processes (Denger et al, 2007) . This is particularly important because software failures are becoming one of the main sources of medical device recalls and litigation (Jones, Jetley, and Abraham, 2010; Mai-Duc, 2011) . Firms in the medical device industry are responding both by building closer connections to external software suppliers and by hiring large numbers of software engineers, while giving software development teams a much larger stake in the product development and strategic decision-making in the industry (Bakal, 2011) .
Similarly, pharmaceutical firms have also witnessed an increasing dependence on software in product development and innovation, predominantly in the form of bioinformatics and computational biology.
Bioinformatics and related domains have become key tools in drug development, even if their deployment has not prevented an apparent decline in pharmaceutical research productivity (Searls, 2000) . 6 Computer models and simulations now play crucial roles in the discovery of new substances with potential therapeutic benefits. While in the early 1990s large drug discovery screening programs produced approximately 200,000 data points annually (Drews, 2000) , nowadays software advances have enabled typical pharmaceutical labs to generate more than 100 gigabytes of data in a single day (Gassmann, Reepmeyer, and Von Zedwitz, 2010) . As a consequence, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies rely on increasingly complex algorithms and software packages to deal effectively with this proliferation of information (Duardo-Sanchez, Patlewicz, and Lopez-Diaz, 2008) .
In summary, technologists and industry practitioners assert that software has become an increasingly crucial input into innovation and product differentiation across a wide array of manufacturing industries far beyond the traditional definition of electronics and information technology. 7 However, the engineering literature documenting this shift has tended to be largely anecdotal, relying heavily on a small sample of probably unrepresentative products and firms. In the next section, we use far more comprehensive patent and patent citation data drawn from these industries to support these assertions, finding evidence of statistically significant trends in the data that are consistent with the rising importance of software as an input into invention and product development.
III. Measuring the Shift in the Technology of Technological Change

A. Approach
If innovation in autos and auto parts, aerospace and defense, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals has increasingly come to rely on software as an input into the production of new knowledge, then we would expect this fact to be reflected in patent data. Specifically, we should observe that more recent cohorts of patents generated by these industries cite software technologies with increasing intensity, and we would 6 It is important to note that, in most of our target industries, software has become increasingly embedded in the products themselves. However, in the pharmaceutical industry, software has significantly affected the innovation process but not the products. This significant difference led us to rerun our main empirical specifications without including pharmaceutical firms -results confirm that our main results are not qualitatively affected by the inclusion or exclusion of this industry.
7 See Bharadwaj et al (2013) to study how digital technologies have been changing firms' business strategies, capabilities, products and services. Iansiti and Lakhani (2014) provide excellent examples of wide digital transformation and connection in traditional industries. expect this to be the case even after we control for the changes over time in the volume of software patents.
The use of patent citations is common in the economic and management literatures as researchers have used patent citations as a measure of knowledge flows for decades (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002) .
Following the approach in Arora, Branstetter, and Drev (2013) , which builds on the seminal work undertaken by Caballero and Jaffe (1993) and Trajtenberg (1996, 2002) , we employ a citation function model in which we model the probability that a particular patent p, granted in year t, cites another patent, P, granted in year T.
In line with previous work, this citation probability is modeled as the product of an exponential process by which knowledge diffuses and a second exponential process by which knowledge becomes superseded by subsequent research. The resulting probability, Pr(p,P), is thus a function of the attributes of the citing patent p and the cited patent P, captured by the term α(p, P) below, as well as the time lag between the grant years of the two patents, (t-T):
(1)
All potentially citing patents and all potentially cited patents are sorted into cells corresponding to their patent attributes. The measured attributes of the citing patents consist of the citing patent's grant
year, the primary industry of the assignee's firm, and a binary measure of the patent's technology field (software or non-software). The measured attributes of the cited patents consist of the cited patent's grant
year and its technology field. As a result, the expected number of citations from a group of citing patents with a particular set of attributes to a group of cited patents with a particular set of attributes can be written out as follows:
where the dependent variable measures the number of citations made by patents with grant year t, industry a and technology field b to patents with grant year T and technology field c. The alpha terms are multiplicative effects estimated relative to a benchmark or "base" group of citing and cited patents, and ntab and nTc are the counts of patents in the respective categories. Rewriting equation (2) gives us the Jaffe -Trajtenberg (2002) version of the citation function, expressing the average number of citations from one category of patents to another:
If we add an error term to this expression, as in equation (4) below, then we can estimate it using a nonlinear least squares approach.
When estimating the empirical version of equation (4), we have to also adjust for heteroskedasticity by weighting the observations by the square root of the product of potentially cited patents and potentially citing patents corresponding to a particular cell, namely
In this analysis, we use utility patents granted by the In the next step, we connected the identified firms to their U.S. patent portfolios using the updated NBER patent database. 10 We only retained firms whose total number of patents between 1981 and 2005 is at least 10 in order to make sure our sample includes firms that are active producers of patented inventions. 11 The U.S. patent portfolios of the retained firms constitute our set of potentially citing patents. The set of potentially cited patents is the universe of patents granted by the USPTO from 1981 through 2005.
Next, we identified software related patents, which is a perennial challenge in the empirical literature.
In this paper, we have taken an approach similar to that of Arora, Branstetter, and Drev (2013) . First, we generated a set of patents, granted after January 1st 1985 and before December 31st 2005 that used a set of keywords associated with software-based technologies (e.g. "computer program" or "software"), as defined in Bessen and Hunt (2007) . Second, we identified patents that fell into the narrow set of IPC categories as defined in Graham and Mowery (2003) . We then defined the population of software patents for the purposes of this paper as the union of these two sets of patents. This yielded 318,105 patents, 17,956 of which were assigned to firms in our sample.
As is the case in most studies that rely on patent data, our inference will need to be guided by an awareness of our data limitations. In the early years of our sample, the U.S. patent system operated under legal guidelines that held "pure" software inventions to be unpatentable. As that legal doctrine changed, the number of patented software inventions grew sharply. 12 This makes it imperative that we directly control for the expansion in the pool of software patents over time, which is exactly what the citation function approach allows us to do. Our analysis relies on patents granted by a single authority -the USPTO -to measure invention for both the United States and foreign firms in our sample. However, the foreign firms in our sample tend to be reasonably large entities with significant sales in the United States.
For that reason, we can expect the foreign firms in our sample to have strong incentives to protect their inventions in the U.S. market with U.S. patents. 13 To the extent that this assumption holds, foreign firms will patent their more important inventions in the United States, providing us with data sufficiently rich to capture important changes in their technological trajectories.
C. Results
We first look at the descriptive results presented in Figure 1 , which show a stark increase over time in the software intensity of innovation for firms in our sample industries. As a total, the share of software patents in their patent portfolios increased from 3.5% to 14.4% over the sample period, a fourfold increase. Similarly, the share of citations going to software increased threefold over the sample period from 4.5% to 13.4%, with a particularly striking increase in the period following the year 2000. 14 Importantly, we observe the same trend when we look at the share of software citations coming from non-12 Graham and Mowery (2003) and Bessen and Hunt (2004) provide excellent overviews of the evolution of the patentability of software inventions in the United States, as well as the various approaches to defining software patents. 13 U.S. patents have been used to measure inventive output in Britain (Griffith, Harrison, and Van Reenen, 2006) , Japan (Branstetter and Sakakibara, 2002) , Israel (Trajtenberg, 2001) , and a number of other countries. 14 The NBER Patent Database ends with patents granted in 2006. We are currently working to update our data set through 2012. Preliminary analysis based on updated patent data shows that the qualitative results identified in this paper continue to obtain in the years after 2012.
software (e.g. chemical, mechanical, and electrical engineering) patents. This suggests that that the observed sharp increase in the software intensity of innovation by our sample firms over the sample period is not entirely driven by the proliferation of software patents.
[ Insert Figure 1 Here ]
Estimation results for the patent citation functions are presented in Table I . The unit of analysis is an ordered pair of citing and cited patent categories. Coefficients are reported as deviations from the baseline category -thus a positive coefficient indicates an increased citation probability relative to that category, while a negative coefficient indicates a decreased citation probability relative to the baseline category.
Our results indicate that newer cohorts of patented inventions in our sample industries are increasingly likely to cite prior patented inventions, even after controlling for increases in their volume. Importantly, we see that software patents are much more likely to be cited than non-software patents. The cited software dummy in the first column is positive, large, and statistically significant, indicating that patents belonging to our sample firms are 24% more likely to cite software patents than non-software patents, controlling for the sizes of available software and non-software patent pools.
Estimation results reported in the third and fourth columns further solidify the point that there has been a sharp increase in the likelihood of citing software patents from 1986 to 2005. 15 In these specifications, we restrict the population of potentially cited patents to include only software patents. The key result is illustrated in Figure 2 below, which plots the coefficients from the third column of Table I, along with their 95% confidence intervals. This figure shows a striking increase in the propensity of non-software patents generated by our sample firms to cite software prior art, even controlling for the expansion of software patents that occurred over this period. This trend emerges in the late 1990s, and accelerates through the end of our sample period, displaying a timing that is almost perfectly coincident with the rising importance of software articulated by the industry experts and engineering studies cited in the previous section. 16 We see that a non-software patent belonging to a firm in one of the industries we study
in the year 2004 is more than three times more likely to cite a software patent than a similar patent granted in the year 1986, with a high degree of statistical significance. These results align closely with the descriptive trends reported in Figure 1 . We see this as strong evidence that the trajectory of technological In results not shown in the paper, we estimated the citation function by excluding patents granted to pharmaceutical firms from our sample patents. Because software in this industry should be mainly related to process innovation, while software in other industries (auto and auto parts, aerospace and defense, and medical devices) would be related to both process innovation and product innovation. 17 The regression results using this restricted patent data are qualitatively similar to the results in Table I . We also run a variant of our citation function regressions that uses "forward" citations (citations received) instead of "backward" citations, seeking to measure how often the inventions of our sample firms are themselves cited by subsequent software inventions. We find that newer cohorts of patents belonging to firms in our sample are increasingly likely to be cited by subsequent software inventions, suggesting that our sample firms' R&D is increasingly embedded in and relevant to software-related technologies.
IV. Comparing Firm-Level Innovation Performance
In the previous section, we showed that there has been a software-biased shift in the nature of technical change in an array of industries, especially since the mid-1990s. Can we use this underlying trend to explain the relative innovative performance of firms in these industries? We expect that firms with a higher degree of software competence will exhibit relatively better innovative and economic performance than firms with a lower degree of software competence. If software becomes more important over time, then we should expect that the performance difference between more and less software intensive firms has grown in recent years.
In order to empirically explore these connections, we use two separate (but related) approaches: the innovation (patent) production function and the market valuation of R&D (Tobin's Q) model.
A. Innovation (Patent) Production Function
The premise of this empirical approach is based on Pakes and and Hausman, Hall, and Criliches (1984) . We use a log-log form of the patent production function.
In equation (6), !" are patents taken out by firm i in period t, !" are research and development expenditures, ∅ !" represent measures of innovation-sector-specific technological opportunity, and ! indicates if the firm is software-intensive. In equation (7), ! represents patenting propensity differences across c different innovation sectors. We derive our estimating equation by substituting (7) into (6) and taking logs of both sides, thus yielding:
The error term is defined below:
We allow the error term in (9) to contain a firm-specific component ! , which accounts for the intraindustry firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity, as well as an random disturbance !" . While ! would be swept out in a linear model with firm fixed effects, because it is time invariant, we can interact ! with dummy variables corresponding to subperiods of our 1981-2005 time frame and estimate the coefficients on the interaction terms. 18 If we find that the coefficients on our interaction terms are statistically significant and rising over time, this would constitute evidence that the relative performance of firms that are software-intensive throughout our sample is increasing as innovation itself has become more software-intensive. Since the dependent variable is a count variable, we use the negative binomial estimator developed by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) to estimate (8).
B. Market Value (Tobin's Q) and Shadow Value of R&D
Since the late 1960s (Brainard and Tobin, 1968; Tobin, 1969 ), Tobin's Q has been widely used to measure the relationship between a firm's market value and the replacement value of its book equity. The value of Tobin's Q is affected by both a firm's tangible capital and its intangible capital. A firm's intangible capital (stock of knowledge measured by its R&D stock) has been found to have a positive relationship with the market value of a firm (Griliches, 1981) . Following Griliches' seminal work, hundreds of academic papers in a variety of industry and national contexts have used a firm's R&D stock as a measure of its intangible capital in order to investigate its relationship with market value.
Following previous work, we assume an additively separable linear specification (Griliches, 1981; Hall and Kim, 2000; Bharadwaj et al, 1999) . 19 Let !" and !" be the market value and the replacement cost of tangible assets of firm at time , respectively. Then the relationship between the two variables can be written as follows:
where !" represents the replacement cost of the firm's stock of knowledge, typically measured by stocks of R&D expenditures, ! represents the average market valuation coefficient of the firm's total assets, ! is the shadow value of the firm's technological knowledge measuring the firm's private returns to R&D, and ! determines returns of scale. Following standard practice in the literature, we transform the above equation by taking natural logarithms (e.g. Hall and Oriani, 2006) as follows:
By assuming ! equals one (constant returns to scale) and subtracting !" on both sides, we can obtain the following equation:
Finally, we define Tobin's Q as the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost of tangible assets and rewrite the equation as follows:
Following Hall and Kim (2000) and Arora, Branstetter, and Drev (2013) , we estimate equation (13) using nonlinear least squares estimators (NLS). 20 In order to capture the difference in the market's valuation of the private returns to R&D between firms with a higher and lower degree of software intensity, we add software intensity dummies to the model. We also include time dummies to account for a secular time trend. As a robustness check, we also estimate the equation using a linearized version of the model, with firm fixed effects, and, in these models, we can interact our time dummies with our software intensity dummies, as we did in the previous patent production function analysis. 19 Our notation follows Hall and Kim (2000) . 20 Fixed effects and random effects estimators are used. For robustness checks, we estimated a linearized version of equation (13) 1981-1988, 1989-1996, and 1997-2005 .
At a first glance, it might seem counterintuitive to construct software intensity variables by averaging across time periods as opposed to simply using annual software intensity measures. However, this was necessary for several reasons. First, some firms do not report patent applications in some years. Second, firm-level software intensity measures can fluctuate significantly from year to year, especially for firms with limited patent output, but it is not reasonable to assume that these short-term fluctuations always reflect real changes in a firm's innovation process. For example, if a firm applied for a software patent and a non-software patent in 1990, the observed share of software patents in its total annual portfolio would be 50%. Suppose, however, that in 1991 this same firm applied for two non-software patents and no software patents. Then, the observed share of software patent in that year would be 0%. Finally, if the firm applied only for a single software patent in 1992, then the share of observed software patents would be 100%. As we do not believe these annual fluctuations are necessarily reflective of an underlying drastic change in the software intensity of this firm's innovation process, so we prefer to average software intensity measures over a longer period of time.
In order to operationalize software intensity measures, we create a binary measure that classifies sample firms into two groups: (1) the above-median software intensity group and (2) the below-median software intensity group. For Tobin's Q regression analysis, we also construct period-specific software intensity dummy variables that allow firms to switch between the two groups. top UK R&D firms. 23 We exploit the EDGAR database to collect R&D information for some firms that are not captured in Compustat or the R&D Scoreboard. Japanese firms' R&D data comes mainly from the Kaisha Shiki Ho Survey database. South Korean firms' data is collected from the Korea Listed Companies Association. We deflate R&D expenditure using several alternative deflators, checking for consistency and robustness. 24 We found our results are not sensitive to the choice of deflator.
R&D Stock: Following Arora, Branstetter, and Drev (2013) and others, we use the perpetual inventory method to calculate R&D stocks. A fifteen percent depreciation rate was used Hall, 1990) . 25 The initial R&D stock was calculated using the previous five years' worth of R&D expenditure flows. 26 In order to impute R&D expenditures in years for which data were unavailable, we used a linear extrapolation based on the first five years of available R&D expenditures. 27
Market Value: We estimate the market value of a firm by following the method proposed by Perfect and Wiles (1994) . We define the market value as the sum of market values of the firm's equity and debt. For the firms whose data is taken from Compustat, we estimated the market value of the firm's equity as the sum of (1) year-close price of outstanding common shares multiplied by the year-close number of outstanding common shares and (2) (Arora, Branstetter, and Drev, 2013) . We define the market value of the firm's debt to be equal to the sum of long-term debt and short-term debt. For the firms from Compustat, we used total long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. For Japanese firms from the DBJ database, we used fixed liabilities as a proxy for the value of the firm's debt. 28
Replacement Value of the Firm's Assets:
It is not easy to estimate the replacement value of a firm's assets mainly because there is often no structured and active market for used capital goods. However, Perfect and Wiles (1994) show that replacement values calculated using different methods are relatively robust. In this paper, we use the book value of a firm's total assets as a proxy for their replacement value.
D. Innovation Production Function Results
In the previous section, we showed that patented inventions in an array of manufacturing industries increasingly rely on software-related prior art, even after controlling for the increased pool of citable software patents over time. Now we go a step further and investigate how firm-level innovation productivity is determined by a firm's software competence (intensity). We have to go beyond a descriptive analysis as many factors, such as differences in R&D investment, can influence any observed 25 Different depreciation rates between 10% and 30% were applied for constructing the R&D stock. This paper reports the estimation results using 15% depreciation. Applying the different rates did not alter our results significantly. The estimation results using other depreciation rates are available from the online appendix. 26 For example, R&D stock in 1990 is the sum of the R&D expenditure in 1990 and depreciated R&D expenditures from 1986 to 1989. 27 For instance, assuming that R&D expenditure in 1980 is missing, we get the projected R&D expenditure in 1980 by "backcasting" using R&D expenditure data from 1981 to 1985. 28 See Perfect and Wiles (1994) for a detailed discussion of measurement error issues when using book values. changes in inventive output. As a consequence, we want to see whether firms with a higher degree of software intensity produce more patented inventions per dollar of R&D than firms with a lower degree of software intensity. Furthermore, in order to make sure differences in the quality of patented inventions between the two groups of firms are not driving our results, we also control for patent quality. We follow the literature and use quality corrections based on the number of claims found in a patent document and the number of forward citations that a patent receives. Table II presents our first set of key patent production function estimation results. The magnitudes of the key coefficients from the second column of Table II are graphically represented in Figure 3 , where the bars represent how much the above-median software intensity firms increased their innovative productivity relative to the below-median software intensity firms in each period, relative to the base period of the early 1980s (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) . We observe an increasing R&D productivity gap over time in favor of more software intensive firms across all industries in our sample. The R&D productivity gap began to emerge since the early 1990s. Consistent with the notion that the importance of software as an input into the creation of new technology has increased in recent years, we observe the most significant relative patent productivity gains by above-median software intensity firms in the last two periods in our sample (1996-2000 and 2001-2005) . 29 These firms became about 40% more productive than their belowmedian software intensity peers in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It would be reasonable to expect that the R&D productivity gap between highly software intensive firms and their less software intensive peers has continued to widen over the past decade, and preliminary analysis with updated data appears to confirm this hypothesis.
[ Insert Figure 3 Here ]
The results reported in Table II were estimated using a negative binomial model, though our results are robust to the exact choice of specification. 30 The first and second columns report regression results obtained where the total number of patents applied for by firm in year is the dependent variable. The third and fourth columns report regression results using the number of claims within firm i's cohort of patents applied for in year t as the dependent variable. The fifth and sixth columns report results using the number of forward citations received by firm i's cohort of patents applied for in year t as the dependent 29 Figure 3 doesn't necessary tell us that the productivity gap in the late 1990s is slightly greater than the one in the early 2000s. The coefficient of the interaction term of the last period (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) is generally greater than the one of the previous period (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) when estimating with the other software intensity (share of citations directed to prior software patents) and a Poisson model. The size of the coefficients of these two periods also marginally changes with different dependent variables (number of claims and number of citations). 30 Use of a Poisson regression model yields similar coefficients. variable. The citation data set extended through 2010.
The R&D productivity coefficients are very similar across the columns. They provide evidence that highly software-intensive firms started to produce more patents per R&D dollar than less software intensive firms over our sample period, without sacrificing the quality of their patent portfolios. 31 Most of the coefficients on our key variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. Random effects and fixed effects models produce similar estimates. This suggests that our regression results are unlikely to be driven by time-invariant unobserved firm-specific differences in research productivity or propensity to patent. We estimated the regressions by excluding pharmaceutical firms from our sample. The regression results excluding pharmaceutical firms are qualitatively similar to Table II . We conducted separate regressions using two subsamples; U.S. firms and non-U.S. firms. The results from both regressions are qualitatively the same with the results in Table II . We also re-estimated the regressions reported in Table   II , but where software intensity was measured by the share of patent citations made to software prior art rather than the share of software patents. The results obtained are qualitatively similar, showing a statistically significant increase in patent productivity in the later periods. Finally, we allowed both measures of software intensity to vary within firms over time and re-estimated our specifications, again obtaining results showing that the patent intensive firms become significantly more productive, and this result strengthens over time. All of these additional results are available from the online appendix.
As an additional robustness check, we also conducted a series of falsification estimations in which we replaced our firm-level metric of software intensity with alternative firm-level characteristics that one could possibly expect would be driving our results. 32 We report the results of one such exercise in Table   V , in which we estimated our base patent production function specification, but replaced software intensity with a measure of firm size. The key variable does not show any significant results, suggesting that firm size does not impact the patent productivity of our sample firms. This is significant as it invalidates a key alternative explanation for our results -namely, that larger firms are both more productive in their inventive activities and more software-intensive.
E. Private Returns to R&D
While we have already shown that more software intensive firms exhibit increasingly higher R&D productivity as measured by production of patented inventions than their less software intensive peers, we would also like to investigate whether the R&D investment of these firms receives a higher 31 We regard the number of claims and the number of citations as proxies of the quality of the patent. 32 Aral, Brynjolfsson, and Wu (2006) show the existence of the "virtuous cycle" in the relationship between IT investment and productivity. valuation from equity market investors than the R&D investments of their less software-intensive peers.
Tobin's Q regressions allow us to do just that: establish how the software intensity of a firm is associated with the equity market's valuation of the private returns to its R&D investment. Table III reports estimation results for our base Tobin's Q specification shown in equation (13) using nonlinear least squares (NLS) estimators. Figure 4 graphically depicts the average difference in the estimated private returns to R&D between above-and below-median software intensity firms. 33 In Table III and Figure 4 , software intensity is inferred from the share of software patents in a firm's total patents.
[ Insert Figure 4 Here ] Figure 4 shows that above-median software intensity firms exhibit a higher estimated return to R&D investment and that this trend has accelerated in more recent time periods. 34 At the beginning of our sample period (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) , the estimated (private) return to R&D investment for above-median software intensity firms was not materially different from that of below-median software intensity firms. The effects of a software biased technology shift thus did not become apparent until the mid-1990s. Abovemedian software intensity firms in this period (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) started exhibiting higher estimated returns to R&D investment than their below-median software intensity peers. The difference exploded in the most recent period (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . This trend, which is strikingly similar to that reported by innovation production function estimations, shows that firms which started producing more software-intensive inventions have become increasingly rewarded by stock market investors with higher market valuations.
The results of Tobin's Q estimations are robust to a variety of robustness checks. For example, we estimated a linearized version of equation (13) using ordinary least squares (OLS) with firm-level fixed effects, and found the results using OLS/FE to be qualitatively robust. This is reported in Table IV . The trends in measured private returns to R&D for above-median software intensity firms relative to belowmedian firms were qualitatively similar to those obtained from the NLS specifications. The regression results are consistent with our main results when pharmaceutical firms are excluded from our sample. We also replicated Table III and Table IV by running regressions using two subsamples; U.S. firms and non-U.S. firms. The results from both regressions are qualitatively the same as the results reported in Table III   and Table IV . Finally, we re-ran the regressions in Tables III and IV, measuring software intensity with the share of patent citations directed to software prior art. The results are quite similar to those show in 33 It is calculated as the difference between the below-median software intensity group subtracted from abovemedian software intensity group. 34 Time periods are somewhat different from the patent production function analysis. We added additional years for each period because of the limited number of observations. the paper. The results of all of these robustness checks are available from the online appendix.
V. Discussion
Two key facts can be derived from our analysis. First, there exists robust empirical evidence indicating the growing importance of software-related technologies and skills for successful innovation in fields far beyond the traditional borders of information technology and electronics. Software is increasingly central to innovation in automobiles and auto parts, aerospace and defense, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals. Secondly, firms in these industries which rely less on software in their R&D activity are increasingly being outperformed by their more software-intensive peers in terms of their innovative activity, as measured by patents and by the stock market's valuation of R&D investment. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that documents the extent and pervasiveness of this shift.
However, these observations lead to an obvious question: if software is so important for successful innovation in the more traditional manufacturing sectors that are the subject of our study, then why are not all firms exploiting it in equal measure? One obvious response is that low R&D productivity and low software intensity are both consequences of managerial failure. Firms with progressive managers recognize the opportunity presented by the rising importance of software and create capabilities within the firm that allow it to exploit this opportunity. Firms with less adept managers neither recognize the opportunity, nor build the capabilities necessary to exploit it. A stream of the recent management literature has focused on how managerial mind-sets, formed through years of inexperience, affect the (in)ability of firms to make strategic shifts when firm environments change (Bettis and Hitt, 1995) . In the economics literature, Nick Bloom, John Van Reenen, and their coauthors have shown that persistent performance differences across firms based in different countries could be driven by differences in management practices (Bloom et al., 2012; Van Reenen, 2007, 2010) . The papers also show that multinationals tend to bring their management practices, both good and bad, with them when they set up subsidiaries abroad. Cole (2006) and Cole and Fushimi (2011) argue that the striking international decline of Japan's once formidable IT industry stems from managerial failure -the "hardware-centric" managers of Japan's IT firms simply could not recognize the software-biased shift in technological opportunity in IT, nor adapt to it.
The prior work of Arora, Branstetter, and Drev (2013) suggests an alternative explanation for the relatively poor performance of Japan's IT industry that is rooted in resource constraints. These authors used statistics on university graduates by discipline and immigration by occupation to create a rough statistical portrait of the human resource pool available for employment in software and related disciplines for the U.S. and Japan. They show that Japan consistently lagged the U.S. in terms of human resources in this domain, and that the gap between the two countries widened enormously in the mid-tolate 1990s as global demand for this specialized human capital intensified. This dramatic widening of the human resource gap was driven mostly by differences in immigration, especially the entry into the U.S.
labor market by Indian-born software professionals under the auspices of America's H1-B visa program. 35 Data on software "offshoring" by U.S.-based and Japan-based multinationals is less comprehensive, but any consideration of offshoring would only widen the implied human resource gap.
The current paper features data on firms based in a wider range of countries, but five of the most significant home bases for our sample firms are Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. Using data from the national statistical agencies on university graduates by discipline and the immigration of IT professionals, we measure the software engineering labor pools in Figure 5 , which portrays implied "flows" of IT workers in these four countries and the United States. What is immediately apparent is that the U.S. has a sizable human resource advantage in this domain, and it widens considerably over time. Immigration into the U.S., especially from India, plays an important role in enlarging and maintaining this advantage, even in more recent years, when a statutory "quota" has limited the number of H1-B visas issued. Any consideration of software offshoring expands the gap even more, and any reasonable estimate of the "stock" of software engineers implied by these flows paints an even more overwhelming picture of American dominance. 36 [ Insert Figure 5 Here ]
This suggests that firms headquartered in the United States have a "built-in" advantage in softwarecentric research. This is significant, because when we examine which firms in our sample are in the top quartile in terms of measured software intensity, these firms are disproportionately American, and that is true across all four sectors that are the target of our current study. 37 Foreign firms rising into the top quartile are generally large multinationals. In a moment, we will present evidence suggesting that foreign firms use their U.S.-based research labs to exploit local abundance in software talent.
The existence of a human resource gap in favor of U.S.-based firms is not surprising. The U.S. has held a lead in software since the early days of computing. The leading schools of computer science are all located in the U.S., and America, through its H1-B visa program and strong historical ties to centers of 35 See Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) and Kerr and Lincoln (2010) for studies highlighting the important role of immigrants in American innovation. 36 A discussion of the multiple sources of these data is provided in the supplementary online appendix. 37 Arora, Forman, and Yoon (2008) provide evidence that the United States has been a leading exporter of software products.
Indian software activity, has been able to attract large numbers of foreign software workers to the U.S., even in periods when the global demand for professionals with these skills exceeded the supply in every country. More recently, U.S. multinationals have set up large software engineering centers in India, allowing them to tap this talent without relocating the workers. Multinationals based in other countries have followed suit, but with a lag, and they generally encounter greater cultural barriers. 38 The managerial literature highlights the challenges that arise when firms seek to do strategically significant R&D abroad (Anchordoguy, 2000) . 39 Of course, not all the software engineers who graduate or immigrate into these various national labor markets are employed in new product development, nor are all of these engineers capable of paradigmshattering innovation. The point we are making is that a larger resource pool can ease the constraints on the productivity of the top tier of software engineering talent. Large software engineering projects are labor-intensive, and tend to require a "pyramid" of software engineering talent, with very highly trained software architects at the apex of the pyramid, and large numbers of more narrowly trained programmers at the lower levels. In the sense that trade economists use the term, the U.S. is relatively abundantly endowed in nearly all tiers of software engineering talent, relative to the other major industrial economies.
We posit that firms around the world are seeking to become more software-intensive, and that firms in the U.S. face lower barriers in doing so. The highly uneven geographic distribution of key human resources helps generate the differences in software intensity across firms captured in our data. From the perspective of our sample firms, these differences are at least partly exogenous. This line of reasoning suggests an empirical test which can help us distinguish between an explanation of our results based on managerial failure and one based on geographically variant resource constraints.
If we believed our results were primarily driven by cross-firm (but geography-independent) differences in firms' ability to identify and take advantage of the software-biased technology shift, then we would expect to find that firms vary in how software intensive their inventions are, but we would not necessarily expect to find large differences in the software intensity of R&D conducted by the same firm in different geographic regions. If, however, we believe that geographic differences in the abundance of affordable skilled software labor have been a major factor producing variation in software-intensity across 38 Language barriers can also play a role in hiring foreign software engineers. These issues appear to constrain the ability of firms headquartered in some European countries (Germany, Norway and the Netherlands) to recruit highly skilled foreign workers (McLaughlan and Salt, 2002) . 39 Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) find that national boundaries limit knowledge spillovers. Branstetter (2006) finds that Japanese FDI facilitates knowledge spillovers between U.S. and Japanese inventors, but the impact is limited. Froman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein (2015) suggest that a potential mechanism of geographic concentration of invention measured by patents is the low cost-distance digital communication.
firms, then we would expect to find that firms strategically allocate software intensive inventive activities to those regions where skilled software labor is most abundant. sample conduct significantly more software intensive innovation at home than abroad, the opposite is true for Japanese and European firms. When European firms invent at home, for example, the share of software patents in their patent portfolios is only about 7%. However, when these same firms conduct innovation abroad, which is primarily in the United States, this share rises to about 16%, reaching the share of software patents in the patent portfolios of US firms inventing at home (16%). Further disaggregation of the data by industry and location of foreign R&D supports the view that local human resource abundance has a significant impact on the software intensity of multinational R&D. We get a similar picture if we measure software intensity by patent citations to software prior art.
[ Insert Figure 6 Here ]
We close this section with an anecdote from our own hometown. In recent years, the German auto parts giant Bosch has set up a research facility in the Pittsburgh area -principally motivated by the desire to tap into Carnegie Mellon's software engineering expertise. In personal interviews with some of the managers of this facility, we learned that Bosch's Pittsburgh research facility is just one small part of a major effort by the firm to acquire the software engineering capability that it feels will be essential to its continued competitiveness in auto parts and components. Bosch has set up another software-focused research facility near Stanford and has a major development center in India. Back in the early 1990s, according to our source, the "fuel injection" business unit employed about 7,000 R&D personnel worldwide, of whom only about 150 (2.1%) were software engineers. By the mid-2000s, total global R&D personnel had risen to 11,000, and about 5,000 of these were software engineers (45%). By 2011, Bosch's fuel injection unit employed 4,500 software engineers in India alone. Bosch did not let its German home base prevent it from acquiring the necessary capabilities, but it had to venture quite far from that home base in order to do so, hiring a nontrivial number of U.S.-based and India-based researchers in the process. comprehensive data on the U.S. patent grants awarded to these firms, we find strong statistical evidence for the growing importance of software-related technologies for successful innovation in this diverse array of non-IT sectors. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper in the economics literature that provides detailed empirical evidence for the existence of this important technology trend.
Next, using a panel of the largest publicly traded firms in these industries in the period from the early 1980s to the mid-2000s, we show that firms which draw more upon software-related technologies in their inventive activity are increasingly outperforming their less-software intensive peers. This widening gap is evident both when we investigate the average patent productivity of R&D and when we examine equity market investors' valuations of the firms' R&D investments.
Finally, our paper explores the connection between the measured software intensity of our sample firms and the relative availability of specialized human resources in different national labor markets.
Firms in the highest quartile of measured software intensity are disproportionately American. Using publicly available data on university graduates by discipline and immigrants by occupational category, we document large, persistent, and growing differences in the availability of software engineering human resources across the economies that are the most important home markets of our sample firms. The U.S., which has always been relatively abundant in software related human resources, has significantly expanded its advantage over our sample period. The presence within our data set of firms conducting R&D in multiple countries allows us to further explore the connection between local software engineering human resource abundance and the nature and direction of multinational R&D. We find that U.S. multinationals do significantly less software-intensive R&D in Europe and Japan than they do at home, whereas the opposite obtains for European and Japanese multinationals. This provides additional evidence for the notion that differences in measured software intensity are at least partly driven by labor market constraints. However, more work is certainly needed to fully determine the causal mechanisms underlying our results.
Taken together, our results may provide some interesting implications for the literature on the economics of innovation, for managers, and for policymakers. First, the nature of technological change has shifted in ways that the economics literature --and perhaps some managers --have not yet recognized. While a full assessment of the active and sometimes acrimonious debate over the appropriateness of software patents is beyond the scope of this paper, our results suggest that patented software technology is an increasingly central input into the creation of new products across a wide range of industries. The growing centrality of software may suggest the need for caution in any movement to narrow or restrict the ability of software inventions to benefit from patent protection, much less any movement to abolish software patents altogether. Second, the rise of software as an innovation enabler across the manufacturing space raises the salience of the highly skewed distribution of software human resources across national labor markets and highlights the importance of high levels of in-migration of software engineers into the U.S. in maintaining the competitiveness of U.S. firms in innovation and new product development. Arora, Branstetter, and Drev (2013) suggested that this was a key factor in driving the competitive resurgence of the U.S. IT industry (and the striking competitive decline of the Japanese IT industry) in recent years. The current paper's results suggest that the impact of software extends much farther, into industries typically thought of as rather distant from IT. Ending legislative barriers that currently prevent even higher levels of in-migration of foreign software engineers would likely have benefits that extend far beyond the boundaries of the conventionally defined IT industries.
Ongoing research efforts seek to expand our data set in breadth and time. We are currently updating our patent data to include patents granted through 2012. Preliminary analyses suggests that the trends documented herein have continued (and strengthened) in more recent years, but further confirmation must await a careful accounting of the mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, and new entry that has occurred in our sample industries. Our econometric approach requires data on R&D expenditure, which has proved challenging to obtain for firms located outside the U.S. and the U.K., where current accounting standards require disclosure of "material" levels of R&D expenditure. We are continuing our efforts to expand the set of firms for which we have reasonably high quality R&D data, and we are also expanding the set of firms for which we have the full set of financial variables required for the calculation of Tobin's Q.
Finally, it is apparent that the general trend towards more software-intensive innovation extends far beyond the industries we have yet studied, and we are currently investigating the possibility of extending our analysis further. As is always the case in economics, more work remains to be done. .6 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2000-2005 Coefficients Confidence Intervals (95%) 1981-1988 1989-1996 1997-2005 Coefficients Confidence Intervals (95%) , and firm annual reports. Other firm-level financial data (such as assets, long-term debt, short-term debt, the number of stocks and the price of stocks) are drawn from Compustat, the Development Bank of Japan (BDJ) database, and the TS 2000 (the Korea Listed Companies Association). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Adj R-Squared 0.100 0.131 0.019 0.016 The software intensity is based on the share of software patents. The data for the estimations presented in this table are drawn from the CASSIS patent database maintained by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and from the NBER Patent Data Project database. Firm-level R&D data are collected from the Compustat, EDGAR, the Kaisha Shiki Ho Survey database, R&D scoreboard, TS 2000 database (the Korea Listed Companies Association), and firm annual reports. Other firm-level financial data (such as assets, long-term debt, short-term debt, the number of stocks and the price of stocks) are drawn from Compustat database, the Development Bank of Japan (BDJ) database, and the TS 2000 database (the Korea Listed Companies Association). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Number of Obs  3111  3110  3111  3104  3111 3110 Sales data are used to define firm's size. Firm size dummy is defined as one if the firm's sale is above median. The average value of sales from 1996 to 2005 is calculated because of the following reasons: (1) some firms have missing sales value in the 1980s and (2) sales tend to increase over time. The regression results using the average value of sales from 1981 to 2005 are qualitatively identical. The results are available from the authors by request. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
